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Abstract
The world's markets are increasingly interconnected, imposing additional challenges for
both regulators and market participants. This paper considers the eect of inter-market
dependencies on the spread of endogenously generated merger waves. Though merger activity
can generate eciency gains, it disrupts market competition and can lead to negative eects
for consumers. The conditions under which disruptive merger activity can spread to otherwise
stable markets are identied. It is also shown which inter-market dependency congurations
are more likely to lead to situations in which the stability of some markets can be disrupted
by merger activity in others.
1
Keywords| Cournot competition, agent-based simulation, endogenous mergers, emergent
behaviour, merger waves.
JEL Classication Codes| C63, D21, G34.
1This work was supported by an EPSRC Doctoral Training Centre grant (EP/G03690X/1).
11 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The world's markets are increasingly interconnected. Since 2000, despite the nancial crisis, global
trade has almost tripled in value (WTO, 2013) and foreign direct investment has increased by more
than 25% (WB, 2013). This presents a number of diculties for regulators, whose aim it is to
encourage competition and maintain consumer welfare. Consequently, regulation of competition at
the national level alone has become inadequate (McGowan and Cini, 1999). An increasing number
of regulatory bodies are working together to develop competition policy principles to rule on cases
in which the consequences of activity in one country might signicantly impact other countries
(see ICN, 2013).
Of particular interest to regulators are the consequences of mergers. Though merger activity
can generate eciency gains, it disrupts market competition and can lead to negative eects for
consumers. Mergers have also been found to increase systemic risk (Mishkin, 1999): the risk that
a failure in one part of a system can spread to the whole system. When two rms merge, the
resultant merged rm is often a larger, more signicant market player with more dependents and
more market power. Consequently, its failure will have a larger impact on the surrounding markets.
In 2010 the US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which explicitly requires that all proposed
mergers are evaluated not just by their potential eect on competition, but by their `systemic
footprint' as well (Tarullo, 2011).
Understanding the extended impact of merger activity is made complicated by dynamic depen-
dencies between markets, such as supply chains. Firms dependent on a merging rm, such as
suppliers or distributers, are likely to be aected by merger decisions, in addition to direct com-
petitors. For example, changes to demand have been found to cause merger waves: unpredictable
periods of increased merger activity (Harford, 2005). Similarly, Ahern and Harford (2013) nds
that dependencies between markets can act as pathways for merger waves to spread.
In this paper, we investigate the eect of inter-market dependencies on the spread of endogenously
generated merger waves. This is done by constructing an agent-based simulation model of en-
dogenous horizontal merging in connected markets. Merger waves are then generated by applying
shocks to supply and demand, corresponding to the neoclassical and behavioural theories of merger
wave causes (Harford, 2005). We then identify the conditions under which waves can spread to
markets that would have otherwise remained stable. We also identify which inter-market depen-
dency congurations are more susceptible to disruption than others, and discuss the potential for
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such agent-based models to provide regulators with methods of protecting against destabilising
behaviour.
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2 Model
Following representations in the literature (eg Qiu and Zhou, 2005; Neary, 2007; Horn and Persson,
2001), in our model, a market is composed of a number of agents who engage in a repeated two-stage
game: in the rst stage, agents are given an opportunity to merge, and in the second stage, they
compete to produce a homogeneous good. Markets are connected through supply chains: the goods
produced by rms in one market supply the production of rms in downstream markets.
Each timestep, for each market: (1) all rms in a market evaluate whether or not they wish to
merge; (2) of the rms that wish to merge, one is chosen at random to perform a merger; (3) all
rms establish an ideal production quantity (as in a Cournot competition); (4) all rms attempt
to source goods from rms in supplier markets; (5) all rms produce.
In addition to this, two rms with randomly assigned costs attempt to enter the market and at most
two are randomly removed. This encourages a turnover of market participants and prevents `lock-
out', the situation in which certain entrants become unable to successfully produce in a market
(see Zedan et al., 2013).
Since the goods produced in one market supply another, an ordering is applied on how markets
are updated.
A Market
A market M is a set of rms, where jMj = m. Each rm i is randomly assigned a production cost
ci from within a range [cmin;cmax].
Endogenous merging is modelled as a two-stage game (as in Neary (2007), Qiu and Zhou (2005)
and Zedan et al. (2013)): in the rst stage, rms decide whether or not to merge, and in the
second stage, rms engage in a Cournot quantity competition. The second stage incentivises the
rst. Therefore, we consider the second stage rst.
Stage 2: Competition
In the second stage, all rms in a market engage in a Cournot quantity competition. That is, all
rms produce an identical good, at constant marginal cost and no xed cost, facing a linear inverse
demand curve:
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P =    Q
where P is the market price,  is the market size and Q is total output of all rms in the mar-
ket.
Therefore, the prot-maximising quantity qM
i for rm i to produce in market M is given by:
qM
i =
 +
P
j2M
cj
m + 1
  ci (1)
We can also dene the prot as:
M
i = (P  sM
i )   (ci  qM
i ) (2)
where M
i is the prot for rm i in market M, sM
i is the quantity of goods sold by i, P is the price
at which they were sold, qM
i is the quantity produced and ci is i's cost of production.
To ensure all operating rms are producing non-negative quantites at initialisation, the market
size, , must follow:
 > 0  (m + 1)cm  
m X
i=1
ci (3)
where cm is the largest production cost in the market.
Additionally, following Qiu and Zhou (2005), an upper bound of  is also dened for which a
merger i + j (where m > 2 and ci < cj) is protable:
 
(m + 1)
(m   1)2   2
((m2   1)cj   2mci)  
m X
k=1
ck  M
i;j (4)
If, at time t, M
i;j  0 for some i;j such that i 6= j, there is at least one protable merger in the
system.
 When  > M
i;j 8i;j such that i 6= j, the market size is too large to make any strategic merger
protable.
 When  < 0, there is not a minimum amount of demand to keep all rms producing.
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Therefore, we dene max and min as the maximum and minimum values of  for which mergers
are protable.
max = max(M
i;j) 8i;j i 6= j (5)
Consequently, a market may be in one of three states based on  (see Figure 1):
1. Stable (no mergers are desirable and all agents are producing goods);
2. Unstable:
(a) Mergers are desirable and all agents are producing goods;
(b) Mergers are desirable and not all agents are producing goods.
 
α
α
α
Figure 1: Abstract borders of market size values that incentivise merging and production.
Stage 1: Merging
In the rst stage of the game, rms must decide whether or not to merge based on the payo they
expect to receive in the second stage.
Any rm in the market can act as an acquirer or be a target of a merger oer. Whenever a
merger takes place, one rm ceases to operate (the target of the merger). Therefore, the number
of operating rms m is then reduced by one unit. As a result, market competition is reduced and
all post-merger operating rms benet (an instance of the free-riding eect, see Clougherty and
Duso (2008)). This benet increases with the eciency of the target of the merger; the lower the
production cost of a rm, the greater its eciency. However, ecient targets also demand higher
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acquisition prices. Consequently, the net eect of a merger depends upon the cost conguration of
acquirer and acquiree.
Let us consider the merger process in more detail. An acquirer chooses whether to propose a
merger to a given target rm at a given price, or to pass. A target chooses whether to accept or
decline the oer.
As a target's opportunity cost of accepting a merger's oer is its current prot, the optimal acqui-
sition strategy, when there are m active rms in the market, is to oer target j the acquisition price
of M
j . At this stage, rms assume they will be able to source all goods required for production and
sell all produce. Therefore, let the expected prot for rm i in market M be M
i = (qM
i )2.
Acquirer i's expected prot from proposing to acquire j, at price M
j , in a market with m active
rms is denoted by 
M fjg
i+fjg   M
j and, in equilibrium, target j accepts the oer of M
j .
As a result, a merger is protable if it generates positive surplus, i.e., if the post-merger prot of
operating rms net of their pre-merger prot is positive:

M fjg
i+fjg   M
i   M
j > 0 (6)
A rm may have a strategic incentive to wait and free-ride on other rms merging, as, by doing
this, it may enjoy the benet of decreased competition without having to pay the acquisition
cost.
Supply Chains
Having determined whether or not to merge and how many goods they wish to produce in the
competition stage, rms then need to source and later sell their goods. Exogenously dened supply
chains determine which markets supply other markets.
Dependent on the conguration of markets, a market may act as both a supplier market and/or a
distributor market. Supplier markets sell their goods to distributor markets, that use those goods
in their own production. We assume a one-to-one ratio for production: one unit of supply good is
required in order to produce one unit of good for any given market.
Of additional consideration is the extent to which markets at the same level are producing comple-
mentary or substitutable goods. For example, consider a structure in which markets A and B both
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supply market C. If the goods produced by markets A and B are complementary, in order for mar-
ket C to produce one unit of good it would require one unit from both markets A and B (i.e., two
units of good in total). Conversely, if the goods produced by markets A and B are substitutable,
in order for market C to produce one unit of good, it would require one unit from either market
A or market B. Clearly, these dierent types of dependency relation will have dierent eects on
the extent to which multi-market structures are vulnerable to changes in other markets.
Consider a simple multi-market structure with three markets: a supplier market S, an intermediate
market I, and a distributor market D.
Sourcing and Selling Goods
Consider market I.
Having determined how many goods they wish to produce (i.e., qI
i ), rms in I must source this
many goods from supplier rms in market S. If they manage to source this amount, they produce
their optimum amount. Otherwise, each rm produces as much as they can with the resources
available.
Firms in I are indierent to which rms they obtain goods from in S. However, rms in I will
visit the minimum number of suppliers in order to obtain all their goods.
If a rm is unable to obtain any goods, it is forced to exit the market. Similarly, if a rm is unable
to sell any goods, it is forced to exit the market.
Timestep Evaluation
The simple three market chain model consists of a supplier market S, a middle market I, and a
distributor market D.
Each timestep, the model runs through in the following sequence: (1) at most one rm in S merges
and all rms calculate qS
i , (2) rms in S produce qS
i , (3) at most one rm in I merges and all rms
calculate qI
i , (4) rms in I source goods from rms in S (and rms in S sell goods to market I),
(5) rms in I produce their goods, (6) at most one rm in D merges and all calculate qD
i , (7) rms
in D source goods from rms in I (and rms in I sell goods to rms in market D), (8) rms in D
produce their goods.
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Markets who have no supplier markets are assumed to have access to innite supplies; markets
with no distributor markets are assumed to be able to sell all their goods.
As already mentioned, each timestep, two entrants with costs randomly assigned from a given range
enter each market and up to two rms are randomly removed. All rms then evaluate whether or
not they want to merge. Of the rms who want to merge (if any), a rm is chosen at random to
perform their most protable merger action.
Any rms unable to source any goods, produce any goods or sell any goods, exit the market.
Generating Merger Waves
Markets are aected by the phenomenon of merger waves. It is well documented that merger
activity follows a wave-like pattern; that is, a period of high merger activity is followed by a period
of low merger activity, and vice versa (Town, 1992; Lipton, 2006; Gugler et al., 2008). However,
econometric studies have shown that the precise behaviour of these waves is both highly country
and market dependent (Resende, 1996; Maksimovic et al., 2011).
In attempting to identify the causes of such merger waves, a number of interesting traits have been
noted. For instance, the peaks of merger waves approximately coincide with the peaks of stock
market booms (Gugler et al., 2008) and some waves can only be seen to aect a subset of markets
(Ahern and Harford, 2013). Broadly speaking, the literature provides three potential theory groups
for these surges in merger activity: neoclassical, behavioural and random.
Neoclassical theories, such as the Q-Theory of Mergers (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) and the
Industry Shocks Theory (Harford, 2005), make use of standard neoclassical assumptions to explain
waves. For instance, an industry might receive a shock such as the introduction of a new tech-
nology, which enables them to produce goods at a lower cost. This may then provide new merger
opportunities, resulting in a urry of merger activity. Aggregate merger waves are then caused
when multiple, simultaneous shocks aect a number of industries.
Behavioural theories, such as the Managerial Discretion Theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) and
the Overvalued Shares Theory (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), assume non-rational behavioural traits
of market players. For instance, overcondence in the market may lead to the overvaluation of
stock. This may then encourage managers to make more merger bids than usual, either due to the
increased perceived value of their own rm or a potential target's.
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There is some support also for the view that merger waves occur randomly. That is, that merger
waves may be endogenously generated without any explicitly identiable behavioural or technolog-
ical shock (Shughart and Tollison, 1984). For example, a chance combination of particular market
participants might create a setting in which a merger wave endogenously occurs.
Despite using similar and sometimes identical datasets, empirical investigations have found evi-
dence to support each theory dependent on the ltering techniques applied (Resende, 1999, 2008,
1996; Harford, 2005; Gugler et al., 2008). Lipton (2006) concludes that discrepancies between the
ndings are caused by overtting the models to the data: `The overriding problem with these
models is that none of them work very well outside the market or timeframe over which they were
created'. He argues that this is because there is in fact no single factor that stimulates a wave,
but instead a complex combination of economic, social and legal conditions that make mergers
more appealing during certain periods. We argue that this complexity encourages a bottom-up,
agent-based approach to modelling this problem in which the aggregate eect of individual merger
decisions can be considered.
Dening A Wave
In our model, since at most one merger may take place in each timestep, we will consider merger
desirability: the number of rms in a market who, if given the opportunity, would choose to engage
in a merger. Therefore, a merger wave in our model occurs when one or more rms want to merge
for a number of consecutive timesteps.
Demand Shocks
Shocks to demand may be generated by external control of the  variable. For example, exogenously
created increases in the market size may correspond to boom periods, and decreases may represent
recessions.
Supply Shocks
Shocks to supply may be generated by shifting the range of production costs during simulation. For
example, suppose production costs are drawn from a range [cmin;cmax], technological innovation
might be represented by the reduction of production costs for rms above some cost value cmin <
c < cmax.
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Trivially, waves that are randomly generated by the model do not require specic stimulation.
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3 Behaviour
In this section, we consider a variety of structures of multiple markets connected by supply chains
as dened in the previous section. These are shown in Figure 2. Each box represents a market
of competing rms. The arrows indicate the ow of goods from supplier market(s) to distributor
market(s). Numbers in the graph show the order of play in a given timestep during the simulation.
For example, in the tree market (Figure 2b), in each timestep: (1) rms in market A merge and
produce, (2) market A's produce supplies both markets B and C simultaneously, (3) rms in
market B merge and produce, (4) rms in market C merge and produce, (5) market B's produce
supplies both markets D and E simultaneously, (6) rms in market D merge and produce, (7)
rms in market E merge and produce. This is then repeated.
  
(a) Chain
  
(b) Tree
  
(c) Inverted Tree
  
(d) Lattice
  
(e) Loop
  
(f) Star
Figure 2: Multi-market micro-structures. Boxes contain markets of competing rms; arrows indi-
cate the supply ow of goods between markets; numberings show the simulation order of play.
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Generating Merger Waves
Random Waves
Let us rst consider the random occurrence of merger waves.
Consider a market of rms with the same production costs. The benet of merging would solely
be to reduce the market competition. In fact, for any two agents to merge, it must be that the
payo from merging is greater than the payo from not merging:

M 1
i > M
i
0
B
B
@
 +
m 1 P
i=1
ci
m
  ci
1
C C
A
2
 
0
B
B
@
 +
m P
i=1
ci
m + 1
  ci
1
C C
A >
0
B B
@
 +
m P
i=1
ci
m + 1
  ci
1
C C
A
2
(7)
In the case where ci = c for all i, this becomes:

 + c(m   1)
m
  c
2
 

 + cm
m + 1
  c

>

 + cm
m + 1
  c
2
(8)
Figure 3 shows the payo to a rm in such a market from merging or not merging. As can be seen,
the payo from merging is only more benecial than not merging for very small m. The point at
which this occurs depends on the market conguration. Therefore, in such markets with a large
number of rms, the market is stable.
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Figure 3: Payo from merging vs. not merging for ci = 10 8i and varying m
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Figure 4: Waves of merger desirability. Parameters are:  = 0 + 1, m = 5, cmin = 1 and cmax = m.
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Now, let us consider a market with rms given randomly assigned costs from within a given range.
A simulation run for such a market is shown in Figure 4, which shows the total number of rms in
a market and the number of rms who wish to merge. As can be seen, waves in merger desirability
occur endogenously in the model. This type of wave activity occurs regardless of a market's
position within a multi-market structure, and is a result of the cost conguration of rms within
the market.
Demand Shocks
Consider the eect of exogenously generated shifts in the market size  on the occurrence of
merger waves. This may correspond to behavioural theories of merger waves, such as market
optimism. Alternatively, increases in market size correspond to boom periods, and decreases
represent recessions.
Figure 5 shows the number of active rms and merger desirability, along with  from a representa-
tive simulation run. The market size, , is exogenously made to oscillate about  = 0 +1.
As can be seen, merger waves can be generated by exogenous changes in market size, though do
not necessarily occur during every oscillation of . Figure 6 aggregates merger data from 100 long-
duration (5000 timestep) runs of the model. Here, each dot records the proportion of rms that
want to merge at a point during the sinusoidal wave phase of  from a particular simulation. As
can be seen, though merger waves may occur at any stage during the wave phase, a high proportion
of merger activity takes place when demand is reduced, primarily during depression periods and
early recovery (i.e., the troughs in market size). This is unsurprising when recalling Figure 1, which
suggests that reductions in  increase the likelihood of rms wanting to merge.
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Figure 5: Waves of merger desirability with exogenously determined sinusoidal 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Again, applying demand shocks to a specic market in this way will cause similar results regardless
of the market's position within the multi-market model.
Supply Shocks
Consider the eect of an exogenously generated supply shock caused by shifting the production
costs, ci, that new agents are assigned during simulation. Therefore, suppose rms are originally
randomly assigned costs between 11 and 20. At 500 timesteps, market entrants are now assigned
costs between 1 and 10, corresponding to some a technological innovation. Figure 7 shows simula-
tion results from this shift.
Identifying waves caused exclusively by the supply shock is dicult because there is already a
signicant amount of merger activity in the market caused by the frequently changing cost distri-
butions of rms. These are the result of the random removal and addition of rms in each timestep.
If, however, this feature of the model is removed, the eect of the industry shock on the system
becomes immediately identiable (see Figure 8).
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As can be seen, supply shocks can also generate merger waves. Further investigation into the
dierent types of wave generation in this model can be found in Zedan et al. (2013).
The Spread of Merger Waves
Ahern and Harford (2013) nds that merger waves can spread along supply chains, originating
in one market and then propagating throughout a network. Having now successfully simulated
the generation of waves within a market, we consider whether the model's simple supply-chain
mechanism enables waves to be incited in markets that would otherwise remain stable (i.e., not
exhibit merger waves). We ask whether or not dependencies between markets enable activity in
one market to incite mergers in an otherwise stable connected market.
As can be seen in Figure 1, for a market to be stable, the current value of  must be greater than
max, the maximum value of  for which at least one merger is protable.
Recall:
max = max[M
i;j =
(m + 1)
(m   1)2   2
((m2   1)cj   2mci)  
m X
k=1
ck]
Therefore, M
i;j is largest for rms i;j with the greatest dierence in production costs.
When markets are connected, a stable market (i.e., a market stabilised with xed  and xed
production cost boundaries) may become destabilised by changes to the total number of rms, m.
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the number of rms in a market (m) and the maximum
M
i;j for a xed ci 6= cj. The specic values of the market are not important; the shape of the graph
is consistent across all values.
When a market's -value is above the black dashed line (the maximum M
i;j), no mergers will take
place.
The graph shows that, for m  4, as m increases, max increases. Therefore, the likelihood of
max >  increases. In other words, members of a stable market may be incentivised to merge
when a shock in a connected market signicantly increases m above a particular threshold amount.
This value depends on the market and the value of .
When m < 4, the graph behaves dierently but symmetrically for ci > cj and cj > ci. Interestingly,
we see that for m < 4, dependent on a market's -value, it is also possible that a shock that lowers
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max 
Firm Number, n
Low-Cost Firm acquiring a High-Cost Firm (c_i > c_j)
High-Cost Firm acquiring a Low-Cost Firm (c_j > c_i)
max
Figure 9: Relationship between the number of rms in a market (m) and the maximum M
i;j for a
xed ci 6= cj, when ci > cj and when cj > ci.
m to these values may incentivise a merger wave.
Recall that distributor rms who cannot obtain any supplies are forced to exit the market, as are
supplier rms who cannot sell any goods. Therefore, we can conclude that it is possible for the
total number of rms in a market to change, inciting mergers, based on the supply and demand
in connected markets. Trivially, a market's production quantity changes as rm number and cost
distribution change.
We now consider this in more detail for each multi-market structure. For each structure, let QA
be the total quantity of goods produced by market A, QB by market B and so on. Let the desired
quantity of goods to be produced by rm i in market B be denoted by qB
i and let the maximum
quantity of goods desired by a single agent be qB
max.
3.0.1 Chain
Consider the chain multi-market structure in Figure 10.
Given that the order in which rms in market B are selected to locate suppliers for their desired
goods is random, and the fact that a rm will obtain the maximum possible number of supplies it
needs before the next rm is selected to act, we can make the following statement.
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Figure 10: Chain
In order to ensure the removal of at least one rm from market B:
QA  QB   qB
max (9)
In other words, we must assume that even if the rm producing qB
max was
chosen to locate its supplies last (i.e., all other rms had had an opportunity
to source goods), this rm would be unable to source any goods. As a result,
it would be forced to exit the market.
Note that there is no dierence between substitutable or complementary goods. Trivially, this is
because each market sources goods from only one other market.
Market B is wholly reliant on market A for supplies. Any change in the quantity produced by
market A will have an eect on rms in market B. Similarly, market B is wholly reliant on market
C for demand. Therefore, a merger-inducing shock in one market could spread to all others.
It is dicult to quantify the eect of changes in demand in market C on market B, since a
supplier rm can survive selling any non-zero quantity of good, and supplies at a single rm are
not exhausted before the next rm may sell goods. However, it may be assumed that the larger
the number of rms in market C, the less likely it is for a rm to be forced to exit market B.
3.0.2 Tree
Recall the tree multi-market structure in Figure 11.
  
Figure 11: Tree
Let us consider the general case with a single supplier market
A and fB;C;Ng distributor markets.
In order to ensure the removal of at least one rm from market
B:
QA  QB   qB
max (10)
In this conguration, we note that there is no dierence between
substitutable or complementary goods. However, there is a xed
limited supply from A for all dependent markets.
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It is clear that market B is not just vulnerable to behaviour in its supplier market A, but A's
other distributor markets2 fC  Ng. The proportional size of the other distributor markets is
also likely to aect how much supply is available to rms in market B, since rms are selected
at random from all distributor markets to locate supplies in market A. Therefore, the smaller the
number of rms in market B, or the greater the number of rms in competing markets, the less
likely it is that rms will be able to locate their desired supplies. This, of course, depends on the
quantity produced by market A.
Again, the goods sourcing mechanism makes it dicult to quantify the upstream eect of multiple
suppliers on market A, since a supplier rm can survive selling any non-zero quantity of good, and
supplies at a single rm are not exhausted before the next rm may sell goods. It may be assumed
that the larger the number of rms and markets sourcing supplies from market A, the less likely
it is for a supplier rm to be forced to exit the market. Therefore, this conguration is likely to
result in a supplier market less vulnerable to perturbations in distributor markets.
In addition to changes to supply caused by distributor markets, the supplier market itself might
become unstable. In this case, its unique position as the sole source of supplies leaves all distributor
markets in a vulnerable position. A drop in production would aect all other markets, again due
to the matching mechanism since no market is preferred above another.
Clearly, therefore, this conguration places distributor rms in a particularly vulnerable position
by being heavily reliant on a single supplier. Based on their relative position in the multi-market
structure, some markets are clearly more vulnerable to changes in other markets. The branching
structure enables shocks to be more easily absorbed as they travel up supply chains. Whereas,
where there are single suppliers, shocks to these markets can easily spread downstream through
connected markets.
3.0.3 Inverted Tree
Recall the inverted tree multi-market world in Figure 12.
Let us consider the general case with fA;B;Ng supplier markets suppling a single distributor
market C.
In the case of complementary goods in supplier markets, in order to ensure the removal of at least
one rm from market C:
2Recall: rms in markets who share their supplier markets source supplies simultanously.
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minfQA;QB;QNg  QC   qC
max (11)
Of course, since rms source supplies in a random order, it is very likely that under these conditions
more than one rm will be removed from C. However, to account for the case when the agent with
qC
max is selected last to locate suppliers, this condition is necessary to ensure disruption in the
connected market C.
  
Figure 12: Inverted Tree
Similarly, in the case of substitutable goods in supplier mar-
kets:
X
fQA;QB;QNg  QC   qC
max (12)
From this we can clearly see that market C is more vulnerable to
perturbations in production in any supplier market when goods
are complementary rather than substituable. Since it is the
total supply of goods considered in the substituable case, if one
market consistently underperforms, the others might be able to
ll the demand. However, even if all but one supplier market signicantly overproduces with
complementary goods, any drop is enough to aect market C.
This is also the case for supplier markets. Suppose market A is unable to produce the amount to
prevent rms leaving market C. When goods are complementary, the loss of at least one rm from
market C might result in a supplier in B being forced out of the market. Whereas, the loss of
one rm when goods are substitutable is less keenly felt by both the distributor market and other
suppliers.
As the number of supplier rms increases, distributor market C is just as vulnerable to uctuations
in supplier markets when goods are complementary, though there are more markets that must
sustain a minimum production quantity. However, when goods are substitutable, there is little
change.
For supplier markets, there is a trade-o to be considered; when goods are complementary, they are
vulnerable to uctuations in production in other markets. However, when goods are substitutable,
an increase in the number of markets given xed demand in market C means that markets are
likely to suer a reduction in production since it must be shared with other suppliers.
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There is a clear dierence in the behaviour of the inverted tree multi-market structure when con-
sidering substitutable and complementary goods. When substitutable goods are considered, based
on their position in the world, some markets are able to act as shock absorbers and prevent the
spread of destabilising behaviour throughout the network. However, when considering complemen-
tary goods, their ability to dampen destabilising behaviour is reduced.
3.0.4 Lattice, Loop and Star
  
Figure 13: Loop
The lattice structure itself is made up of two components: a loop
and a star. As already discussed, dependent on their position
within the micro-structure network, a market might be more
vulnerable to destabilisations in other markets or able to absorb
it.
Consider the loop structure in Figure 13. The top half of the
loop behaves as in the tree structure, and the bottom half as in
the inverse tree (see below).
To remove at least one rm from market B (or any similar market at that level):
QA  QB   qB
max (13)
To remove at least one rm from market D, the following must hold in the case of complementary
goods:
minfQB;QC;QNg  QD   qD
max (14)
And, in the case of substitutable goods:
X
fQB;QC;QNg  QD   qD
max (15)
Consider the star structure in Figure 14. The behaviour of the loop is now reversed: the top half
of the star behaves as in the inverse tree and the bottom half as in the tree (see below).
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Figure 14: Star
To remove at least one rm from market C, the following must
hold in the case of complementary goods:
minfQA;QB;QNg  QC   qC
max (16)
In the case of substitutable goods:
X
fQA;QB;QNg  QC   qC
max (17)
And, in order to remove at least one rm from market D (or any similar market at that level):
QC  QD   qD
max (18)
Now consider the lattice structure in Figure 15. In the example given, the edges of the lattice
structure are loops (markets fA, C, D, Fg and fB, D, E, Gg). However, the structure may also
be modelled with star structures at the edge in a similar gridlike way (e.g., three top level supplier
markets, two intermediate markets and three bottom level distributor markets).
  
Figure 15: Lattice
As in the loop and star congurations that make up the
lattice, the behaviour of markets in the lattice structures
follows the rules of either a tree or inverted tree, depen-
dent on the number of supplier and distributor markets it
is connected to. Therefore, the susceptibility to changes
in supply again depends very much on a market's posi-
tion in the supply chain network. By extension, markets
behave very dierently when complementary rather than
substitutable goods are used; markets are much more
sensitive to changes in supply when goods are complementary.
The Vulnerability of Markets
We have highlighted the importance that a market's location in a multi-market structure has on
its susceptibility to changes in neighbouring markets. Figures 16 and 17 show the extent to which
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the removal of a market aect other markets within a network when considering substitutable and
complementary goods.
  
(a) Chain
  
(b) Tree
  
(c) Inverted Tree
  
(d) Lattice
  
(e) Loop
  
(f) Star
Figure 16: The importance of each market in the structure to other markets when rms produce
substitutable goods. The removal of a single red market will cause all markets to cease production;
the removal of a pink market will cause at least one other market to cease production; the removal
of a white market will not necessarily cause any other market to cease production.
As can be seen, the overall network is more vulnerable to shocks where markets are wholly reliant
on a single supplier or distributor market for goods or demand. By extension, when rms produce
complementary goods, markets become much more dependent on suppliers.
Interestingly, in the case of substitutable goods, the lattice structure, which is a hybrid combin-
ing the loop and star, is able to reduce the impact to the whole network of failure in any one
market.
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(a) Chain
  
(b) Tree
  
(c) Inverted Tree
  
(d) Lattice
  
(e) Loop
  
(f) Star
Figure 17: The importance of each market in the structure to other markets when rms produce
complementary goods. The removal of a single red market will cause all markets to cease produc-
tion; the removal of a pink market will cause at least one other market to cease production; the
removal of a white market will not necessarily cause any other market to cease production.
Increasing Stability
We have demonstrated so far how merger waves may be simulated, and shown how they can spread
between markets. Given their eect on competition, it is important to consider ways of reducing
the impact and spread of waves. In particular, we now ask what can be done from a regulatory
point of view.
First, let us review our ndings:
 Merger waves can arise randomly within a market, or be generated by shocks to demand or
supply;
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 Merger waves can spread between markets along supply chain dependencies;
 Dependent on the dependency conguration between markets, some markets may be more
vulnerable to changes in activity in other markets.
Understanding Merger Waves
Of key concern to regulators are the possible eects of mergers on competition. We know that in
our model mergers reduce competition in a market, benetting rivals. They also oer a potential
increase in eciency to the acquiring rm.
Figure 18 shows scatter graphs of agent lifetimes and production costs from a long-run single market
simulation. Each point on the graph represents a single agent, with red dots identifying rms who
have exited the market through a merger. As can be seen, merger targets are exclusively the high-
and low-cost rms. This is not surprising, since motivations for merging are technological (i.e., a
reduction in production cost) and competitive (i.e., a removal of a rival from the market).
However, as the number of rms in a market decreases, the relative importance of rms remaining
in that market increases. Since markets favour lower production costs, it is more likely that rms
of lower production cost make up the market. Therefore, should a lower cost rm exit the market
(e.g., through failure to source, produce or sell goods, or via random removal), the eect that such
a loss has on the remaining participants is larger than the eect of the removal of a higher cost
rm. This eect extends to dependent suppliers and distributors as well: fewer goods are required
from a supplier market and similarly produced for a distributor market. Therefore, the loss of
a low-cost rm could result in the loss of rms in supplier and distributor markets. This is the
systemic impact of a rm's exit.
This raises the question: should the loss of a large rm (i.e., one with a low production cost in
our model which is thereby capable of producing a higher quantity of goods) be permitted to fail
(i.e., exit the market), given its increased importance in the supply chain? The `too big to fail'
topic is one of ongoing interest (see Mishkin, 2005). Current market regulation already attempts
to control for this situation by preventing mergers that would result in monopolies.
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Figure 18: Production cost and agent lifetime categorised by rms who exit the market through
mergers (bottom) and those who are forced to leave through an inability to produce (top). Costs
are drawn at random from a uniform distribution between 3 and 5,  is intialised to 0 and m = 10.
The Spread of Waves
In our model, the spread of merger waves is done through a reduction or increase in the number
of rms in a market. Therefore, an otherwise stable market may be subject to merger waves due
to behaviour in supplier or distributor markets.
A consequence of this is that the rms in one market may become controlled by the behaviour of
another market. Therefore, a sudden drop in supplies could result in a market monopoly if all but
one rm was unable to source goods. Therefore, of interest to regulators are ways of reducing the
dependence of rms on other rms.
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Our model has shown that having multiple supplier markets producing substitutable goods is
the best way of reducing dependencies on supplier markets. Recall how bottleneck markets were
capable of `absorbing' shocks from both upstream and downstream markets. However, this is
not necessarily benecial for rms in the supplier markets themselves, since they are eectively
in competition with rms supplying the same market. Additionally, the overhead of sourcing
goods from multiple rms or markets may make it an unattractive option to rms. Therefore,
in order to reduce the reliance on a particular market or group of markets, some incentive (e.g.,
a reduction in the cost of goods) might be given to rms to source goods from multiple markets
where possible.
Our model also suggests that markets with a large number of participants are less capable of
responding to reduction in supplies than those with a small number of participants. To understand
this, consider two markets A and B, both producing Q goods. Suppose market A has a rms and
B has b rms such that a > b. If A and B both nd themselves supplied Q   x goods, rms in A
each expect to produce a smaller amount than rms in B. Therefore, it is more likely for a rm in
A to be unable to source any good than a rm in B. Consequently, it is more likely for market A
to receive a loss in rm number (i.e., market B is better able to `absorb' the eect of a reduction
in supplies).
This suggests that markets with a smaller number of rms are less vulnerable to drops in sup-
ply.
The Vulnerability of Markets
Undoubtedly, some markets are more vulnerable to waves and their eects than others. For in-
stance, key markets, such as those that act as bottlenecks, must be carefully regulated since shocks
in those markets are much more likely to aect a number of other markets. Similarly, markets with
a large number of participants are more susceptible to reductions in supply or demand.
However, bottleneck markets are also less likely to be susceptible to shocks in demand and supply
generated in other markets, since they have increased demand and supply risks that are dis-
tributed across the markets they source goods from or sell to. Therefore, although shocks gener-
ated in these markets are likely to have a more signicant eect, shocks received externally are less
likely to spread. Therefore, shocks generated in these markets must be very carefully controlled
against.
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4 Conclusion
This paper sets out to investigate the eect of inter-market dependencies on the spread of merger
waves. This was done by constructing an agent-based simulation model of endogenous horizontal
merging in connected markets. We demonstrated how merger waves could arise randomly in the
market, or be generated through exogenously applied shocks to demand and supply. We considered
a number of multi-market congurations and examined the susceptibility of markets to shocks
generated in other markets.
We also provided a discussion of the potential for such models to suggest ways of protecting against
the destabilising eects of merger waves. Our research suggested that rms with multiple suppliers
or distributors were less susceptible to changes in these markets. However, any shocks generated
in these markets were more likely to spread to other markets. We also found that the more
concentrated a market (i.e., the fewer the number of market participants), the less susceptible it
was to reductions in supply.
The model presented in this paper is intended as a prototype, an instance of how agent-based
modelling can be used to model real-world behaviours and suggest ways of promoting certain
favourable outcomes. It is suggested as future work that the model is calibrated to a particular
industry and validated against empirical results.
As computational power has increased, the development of numerical solutions to complex economic
problems has become more popular. In the last twenty years, the eld of agent-based computational
economics (ACE) has emerged, which models economic processes as dynamic systems of interacting
agents. It has been argued that agents are the best way to model complex systems (Farmer and
Foley, 2009; Arthur, 2005).
Traditional economic models often require the user to assume that households, rms and govern-
ments are perfectly rational, that the economy always settles into a balanced equilibrium, and that
institutional structures and dependencies can be abstracted away. Large-scale ACE models, such
as EURACE (EURACE, 2006) and CRISIS (CRISIS, 2011), attempt to reduce these assumptions
by building bottom-up, agent-based models that can be used for policy making.
Although there are some existing models of merging that consider multiple markets, these focus
on vertical merger waves (e.g., Hombert et al. (2009)) rather than the spread of horizontal waves
between markets. They also do not take into account the dynamic nature of merger decisions;
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models of merging are often represented as one shot, two-stage games (eg Qiu and Zhou, 2005;
Neary, 2007). It is hoped that this model acts as a suitable pathway to encourage future work
into the investigation of dynamic economic and agent-based modelling that can be used for policy
making.
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